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DISPARATE IMPACT 2.0: KARLO PROVIDES A LONG-AWAITED 
UPDATE FOR ADEA SUBGROUP PLAINTIFFS 
Zachary J. Weber* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE NECESSITY OF PROTECTING AGING EMPLOYEES 
The economic recession of 2008-2010 hit few industries harder than 
the auto industry. In the U.S. alone, hundreds of thousands of auto 
workers lost their jobs due to financial cutbacks and production 
stoppages.1 Naturally, businesses reliant on the auto industry, such as 
manufacturers of auto glass, suffered as well.2 Pittsburgh Glass Works 
(“PGW”) was one of those businesses.3 Facing a reduction-in-force 
(“RIF”) of up to 12% of its employees, it hurried to decide which 
employees to terminate, resulting in the hasty firing of many long-time 
employees.4 Rudolph Karlo had worked at PGW as an engineer for over 
thirty years while receiving consistently positive evaluations, earning 
regular promotions, and working to develop eight patents to benefit his 
company.5 Still, PGW abruptly terminated Karlo in 2009.6 The 
company’s stated reason for his termination was that Karlo was not 
“adaptable” and that his supervisor could not “see [him] moving forward 
with the company.”7 Karlo, along with several coworkers who had 
received similar explanations for their terminations, noticed that a 
disproportionate number of PGW employees over fifty were laid off.8 
Understandably, Karlo and his colleagues believed that age, not 
“adaptability,” was the determining factor in the layoff.9 To them, the 
RIF was about more than saving money; it was about eliminating an 
aging workforce. 
Employment discrimination based on age has been an identifiable 
 
            * Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. A Timeline of Auto Sector Layoffs, CBCNEWS CANADA (Feb. 9, 2009, 2:31 PM), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/a-timeline-of-auto-sector-layoffs-1.721556. 
 2. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-1283, 2015 WL 5156913, at *1 (W.D. 
Pa. Sep. 2, 2015). 
 3. Id. at *1-2. 
 4. Id. at *1-2. During one phase of layoffs, PGW’s acting HR director ordered his managers to 
identify terminable employees with instructions to do an “ASAP organization assessment,” and to “risk 
going too far, too fast . . . verses [sic] the opposite.” 
 5. Second Amended Complaint at 31-32, Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-
1283, 2014 WL 11115751 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2014). 
 6. Id. at 33. 
 7. Id. at 34. 
 8. Id. at 147.  
 9. Id. at 149. 
1
Weber: Disparate Impact 2.0: Karlo Provides a Long-Awaited Update for AD
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
1074 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
problem in the U.S. since at least the 1960s.10 In fact, when Congress 
enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA” or “Act”) 
in 1967, it did so with an obvious correlation to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which addressed other problematic forms of 
workplace discrimination.11 Besides the temporal and topical proximity 
of the two Acts, they also share noticeably similar language.12 As this 
Casenote discusses below, this resemblance led courts to treat the 
statutes with similar jurisprudence in the early years of their existence.13 
However, as courts struggled with proper application of these Acts to 
increasingly diverse circumstances, their differences became more 
apparent.14 Not only were courts aware of the inherent dissimilarities 
between age discrimination and the types of discrimination prohibited 
by Title VII,15 they were also uncertain how to interpret a specific 
provision in the ADEA—absent from Title VII—that permits otherwise 
discriminatory acts for “reasonable factors other than age” (“RFOA”).16 
This Casenote explores the similarities and differences in courts’ 
handling of the two Acts before analyzing some recent court decisions 
regarding the ADEA. Specifically, it addresses the question of whether 
subgroups of plaintiffs may raise disparate impact claims under ADEA. 
Section II begins with a synopsis of relevant Supreme Court and 
Appellate Court cases that set the stage for the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC.17 Then, 
Section III analyzes the Karlo decision in light of prior disparate impact 
jurisprudence and scholarship. Agreeing with the Karlo court, this 
Casenote proposes that a plain reading of the ADEA compels the 
recognition of subgroup claims for disparate impact discrimination. This 
recognition would be consistent with both Supreme Court precedent and 
the original objective of the ADEA. Despite outdated decisions to the 
contrary by three circuit courts of appeals,18 recognition of disparate 
 
 10. See infra Section II.A. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2016). Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices 
“because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  
 12. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2016) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2016) (“It shall be unlawful for an 
employer . . . . [to] discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age . . . .”). 
 13. See infra Sections II.A, II.B. 
 14. See infra Sections II.C, II.D. 
 15. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238 (2005). 
 16. 28 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2016). 
 17. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 18. See infra Section II.D. The three decisions referenced here were made before Smith, which 
drastically altered the landscape of disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Two of the decisions were 
also made before O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), which eliminated the 
necessity for ADEA plaintiffs to prove that an employer discriminated against the entire class protected 
2
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impact claims for subgroups is the only consistent and logical 
interpretation of the Act’s language and purpose. 
II.  BACKGROUND: IMPLEMENTATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ADEA 
A.  Legislative History of the ADEA 
While debating which classes to protect from employment 
discrimination under Title VII, Congress considered a protection for 
older workers.19 Ultimately, it rejected this proposal.20 Refusing to 
abandon the issue of age discrimination, Congress requested the 
Secretary of Labor to conduct a study on age discrimination in the 
workplace and report on his findings.21 The resulting report, commonly 
called the “Wirtz Report” after then-Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz,22 
observed that age discrimination did not result from animus or 
intolerance like other types of discrimination.23 Rather, age 
discrimination arose from the presumption that older workers were not 
as effective employees as younger workers, along with other 
“[i]nstitutional arrangements that indirectly restrict the employment of 
older workers.”24 So, while the report found justification to protect older 
workers, it did not equate age with the protected traits covered in Title 
VII. 
Nonetheless, when Congress passed the ADEA just two years after 
the Wirtz Report, its language was nearly identical to Title VII.25 Both 
Acts prohibited the same adverse employment actions “because of” 
certain protected traits.26 However, one significant difference between 
the two was the inclusion of the RFOA exception that has no equivalent 
in Title VII. Responding to the Wirtz Report’s distinction between age 
and other protected traits, the RFOA clause would provide employers 
significant leeway to implement practices that harmed older employees 
 
by the ADEA. Instead, the court held that the ADEA protects against discrimination because of age, not 
because of class membership. 
 19. 110 CONG. REC. 2596-2599 (1964). 
 20. Id. (The amendment was voted down 123 to 94). 
 21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265.  
 22. W. Willard Wirtz, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CONGRESS UNDER 
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965), reprinted in E.E.O.C., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (1981) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]. 
 23. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 
22, at 5). 
 24. See id. (citing WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 22, at 15). 
 25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 26. Id. 
3
Weber: Disparate Impact 2.0: Karlo Provides a Long-Awaited Update for AD
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
1076 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
if age discrimination was not the only motivating factor.27 Additionally, 
Congress created another distinction between Title VII and the ADEA 
when it amended the former in 1991 to codify mixed-motive claims for 
Title VII discrimination.28 The ADEA has never received comparable 
treatment from Congress or the courts, despite a vigorous debate that 
even divided the Supreme Court.29 These two differences between Title 
VII and the ADEA—the RFOA provision and the 1991 Amendment—
have led the two statutes down very different paths within the courts.30 
B.  Griggs and Teal: The Origins of Title VII Disparate Impact Cases  
Courts have never questioned whether Title VII and the ADEA 
prohibited “disparate treatment” discrimination, i.e., intentional acts of 
discrimination against a protected class.31 Indeed, the statutory language 
indicates that this prohibition is the very reason Congress implemented 
these Acts. Yet the statutes are not as clear about “disparate impact” 
discrimination. This type of discrimination occurs when a facially 
neutral employment practice has a discriminatory effect on protected 
employees. 
This latter category of discrimination was the central issue in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co.,32 a case that made its way to the Supreme Court in 
1971. Prior to the passage of Title VII, Duke Power had a history of 
intentional discrimination against African-American employees, and 
limited them to the lowest-paying jobs in the company.33 On the very 
day Title VII became effective, the company changed its policy to 
eliminate intentional discrimination, but implemented a requirement that 
applicants for certain positions have a high school diploma and pass a 
general aptitude test.34 Soon after, a group of African-American 
 
 27. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009) (barring “mixed-motive” 
claims for ADEA plaintiffs). Mixed motive claims are claims that arise from adverse employment 
actions where the employer demonstrated a combination of legitimate and discriminatory motives. 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2016). 
 29. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 180, 190. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, 
interpreted the absence of a parallel ADEA amendment as notice of Congress’s intent to bar mixed-
motive claims under the ADEA. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, refused to attach such 
significance to the 1991 Amendment, instead recognizing the similarity in Title VII and ADEA 
jurisprudence before the Amendment. 
 30. Compare Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 
(recognizing that mixed-motive claims are permissible under Title VII, but holding that a defendant may 
avoid liability in these cases by proving that it would have made the same decision absent any 
discriminatory intent). 
 31. See, e.g., Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch 
Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015). 
 32. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 33. Id. at 426-427. 
 34. Id. at 427-428. 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/7
2018] KARLO AND ADEA SUBGROUP PLAINTIFFS 1077 
employees filed a complaint under Title VII alleging that Duke Power’s 
new practices still constituted racial discrimination.35 The plaintiffs did 
not aver direct, intentional discrimination;36 rather, they relied on 
evidence that African-American employees were disqualified from most 
well-paying positions because of the requirements.37 Ultimately, the 
district court found the practices permissible under Title VII on the 
grounds that they had a legitimate business purpose and applied equally 
to all employees at Duke Power.38 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the practices were 
generally permissible under Title VII, but that the new 
nondiscriminatory practices should not shield an employer from liability 
for past discriminatory practices.39 
 For such a complex and novel issue at the time, the Supreme Court 
decided Griggs with a curiously brief and unanimous opinion.40 The 
Court began its analysis by looking to Congress’s intent in passing Title 
VII, stating plainly that it was “to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers” that might favor certain employees 
over others.41 Going against the lower courts, the Court here declared 
that Congress directed the Act at eliminating practices that resulted in 
discrimination, not only those motivated by discrimination.42 Even 
procedures and practices that are facially neutral are prohibited “if they 
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.”43 While recognizing that Congress permits job-related tests to 
influence employment decisions,44 the Court insisted that these tests 
must relate directly to job performance.45 The Court concluded that its 
determination was consistent with both the purpose of the Act and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) interpretation 
of the Act.46 
In line with this analysis, the Court held that employers may be liable 
under Title VII for practices that lack discriminatory intent but still have 
 
 35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (M.D.N.C. 1968). 
 36. Id. at 245. 
 37. Id. at 247. 
 38. Id. at 251. 
 39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237 (4th Cir. 1970). 
 40. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). Justice Brennan took no part in the 
decision. 
 41. Id. at 429-430. 
 42. Id. at 432. 
 43. Id. at 430. 
 44. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)  (2016). 
 45. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. 
 46. Id. 
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a discriminatory effect against a protected class of employees.47 
Employment-related tests and requirements are permissible, but the 
employer has the burden of demonstrating the connection between the 
test and the job.48 This decision gave birth to the disparate impact theory 
of liability in employment discrimination49—that employers may be 
liable for facially neutral practices when they harm members of a 
protected class at a disproportionate rate. Henceforth, the theories of 
disparate treatment and disparate impact would become fundamental to 
courts’ analyses of discrimination claims and would work to permit 
claims that courts had previously denied.50 
Following the Court’s decision in Griggs, Title VII disparate impact 
claims became commonplace when an employer’s practice negatively 
affected an entire class of protected employees.51 But in Connecticut v. 
Teal,52 the Court faced the question of whether disparate impact claims 
were valid when an employment procedure unfavorably affected some, 
but not all, employees in a protected class. 
The plaintiffs in Teal were a group of African-American employees 
of a state agency who had been disqualified for promotion based on the 
results a written examination.53 Unlike the plaintiffs in Griggs, however, 
the plaintiffs here were a subgroup of the class of protected employees 
because not all African-American employees had been disqualified by 
the test.54 In an interesting twist to this case, while African-American 
employees were disproportionately eliminated from competing for 
promotion by the test, those who passed the test received promotions at 
a disproportionately higher rate than white employees.55 As a result, the 
employer argued that the process as a whole was not discriminatory 
because the end result—the “bottom line”—had no disparate impact on 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 432. 
 49. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (using the term 
“disparate impact” for the first time to describe the type of discrimination found in Griggs); Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (holding that height and weight requirements for a prison guard 
position violated Title VII because it precluded most women from applying); City of L.A., Dept. of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 n.20 (1978) (recognizing the connection between Griggs 
and disparate impact analysis). 
 50. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (finding disparate impact 
claims cognizable under the ADEA); Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015) (finding disparate impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing 
Act); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (recognizing that disparate impact cases are 
cognizable under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 51. See, e.g., Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (cert. denied, 
101 S. Ct. 929 (1981)); American Tobacco v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982). 
 52. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 53. Id. at 443-444. 
 54. Id. at 444. 
 55. Id.  
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African-American employees as a class.56  
 he Supreme Court disagreed with the employer, relying on its 
interpretation of Title VII in the Griggs decision.57 Specifically, it 
looked to § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states 
Congress’s purpose for enacting the Act: “to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities . . . .”58 The Court understood this emphasis 
on opportunities for protected employees as a prohibition on any 
obstacles that might inhibit those employees from equality in the 
workplace.59 The upshot of this construal was that the state’s “bottom 
line” defense was immaterial.60 The Court determined that Title VII 
required equality for all protected employees at every moment of an 
employment practice, not just as an end result.61 Thus, individual 
plaintiffs among a protected class could sue for discrimination under 
Title VII even when the entire class was not adversely affected. 
C.  Hazen Paper: Seeds of Divergence Between Title VII and the ADEA 
While there are many parallels between Title VII and the ADEA,62 
eventually the Supreme Court began to grapple with the differences 
between the two statutes. The decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins63 
is responsible for some of the separation between Title VII and ADEA 
jurisprudence. 
 The complaint in Hazen Paper alleged that the employer had 
discriminated against Biggins when it fired him just weeks before his 
pension plan vested.64 Biggins alleged that the company had 
intentionally discriminated against him because of his age (he was sixty-
two at the time of his firing).65 In arguing his position, he relied heavily 
on the claim that Hazen Paper had fired him to avoid paying his pension 
benefits.66 The Court, addressing the case under the disparate treatment 
theory of discrimination, held that an employer does not violate the 
ADEA when it makes an unfavorable employment action based on years 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 448. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 449.  
 60. Id. at 455. 
 61. Id. at 455-56. 
 62. See supra Section II.A. 
 63. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 64. Id. at 604. The company’s pension plan vested after ten continuous years of employment, 
regardless of an employee’s age. The plaintiff also alleged ERISA violations. 
 65. Id. at 606. 
 66. Id. at 607. 
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of service rather than age.67 
Importantly, the Court addressed the issue of disparate impact 
discrimination in Hazen Paper, but declined to resolve it. Until this case, 
the Court had never stated whether disparate impact claims were 
cognizable for ADEA complaints.68 Indeed, this ambiguity may have 
been the reason that Biggins made his claim under disparate treatment 
when the accusation might have been more suitable under a disparate 
impact theory.69 Nevertheless, the Court’s holding in Hazen Paper led 
many courts to believe that disparate impact claims were not cognizable 
under the ADEA.70 This belief took root despite the Court’s assurance 
that it took no position on the issue when deciding Hazen Paper.71 
D.  Circuit Court Denials of Subgroups in ADEA Disparate Impact 
Cases 
Around the time the Court decided Hazen Paper, the circuit courts of 
appeals were struggling with another issue that separated Title VII from 
ADEA jurisprudence—the issue of subgroups. In Teal, the Court had 
already recognized that Title VII discrimination claims need not 
adversely affect an entire protected class.72 Still, courts were not 
prepared to extend subgroup protection to ADEA plaintiffs for a variety 
of reasons. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to address the issue 
of ADEA subgroups in Lowe v. Commack Union Free School Dist.73 In 
that case, two job applicants (who were also former employees of the 
defendant) alleged that the interviewing and hiring procedures of a 
school district violated the ADEA due to a disparate impact on persons 
age fifty and older.74 The district court refused to instruct the jury that 
 
 67. Id. at 613. 
 68. Id. at 610. 
 69. Id. The Court’s analysis suggests that Biggins’s complaint more closely resembled disparate 
impact because it originated from a policy that was not directly associated with age. Further, after 
explaining the Court’s position (or lack thereof) on ADEA disparate impact claims, the Court simply 
states, “[r]espondent claims only that he received disparate treatment.” 
 70. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999); Gantt v. Wilson 
Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is now considerable doubt as to 
whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 71. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory 
of liability is available under the ADEA, . . . and we need not do so here.”); but see id. at 618 (“[T]here 
are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the 
ADEA.” (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 72. See supra Section II.B. 
 73. Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 74. Id. at 1369. Before the District implemented the hiring procedure in question, it had begun to 
offer voluntary retirement incentives to employees aged fifty-five and older. The plaintiffs’ theory was 
8
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the plaintiffs could prove age discrimination based on disparate 
impact.75 Addressing this issue on appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed 
the issue of subgroups out of hand, based solely on the potential effects 
of hypothetical plaintiffs.76 The court stated that it found no support for 
this type of practice within the ADEA, but offered no textual analysis to 
support this assertion.77 As a result of its denial to recognize subgroups 
of ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision that the District’s hiring procedures did not have 
a harmful disparate impact on candidates aged forty and older.78 
Two years later, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals briefly addressed 
the issue of ADEA subgroups alleging disparate impact discrimination. 
In Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., the plaintiff filed a complaint with the 
EEOC after a RIF when he discovered that the employee who replaced 
him was younger and had less experience than him.79 In its opinion, the 
court cited Lowe, finding that “[a] plaintiff cannot succeed under a 
disparate impact theory by showing that younger members of the 
protected class were preferred over older members of the protected 
class.”80 Thus siding with the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit refused 
to recognize subgroups of ADEA plaintiffs alleging disparate impact.81 
Finally, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the other 
circuits’ stance on ADEA disparate impact subgroups in EEOC v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp.82 Similar to the facts in Tenn. Valley, this 
case involved another RIF where the plaintiffs alleged disparate impact 
on employees age fifty-five and older. Once again, this court rejected 
recognition of ADEA subgroups for disparate impact claims, beginning 
its analysis using the same rationale as the Lowe decision.83 Extending 
this line of thinking, the Eighth Circuit opined that permitting their 
claims might have undesirable effects both for courts and employers.84 
 
that the District did not want to hire any new employees near the age of fifty-five when it was already 
encouraging employees of that age to retire. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 1373. (“If appellants’ approach were to be followed, an 85-year-old plaintiff could seek 
to prove a discrimination claim by showing that a hiring practice caused a disparate impact on the ‘sub-
group’ of those age 85 and above, even though all those hired were in their late seventies”). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 1374. 
 79. Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 924 F.2d 1059, 1991 WL 11271, table op. at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 
4, 1991). 
 80. Id. at *4. 
 81. Id. See also Barnes v. GenCorp Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466, 1467 n.12 (6th Cir. 1990). In 
Barnes, the Sixth Circuit stated the same position on ADEA disparate impact subgroups, but recognized 
that subgroups are cognizable for ADEA disparate treatment cases. 
 82. EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 83. Id. at 950. 
 84. Id. at 951. 
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Regardless of the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, the court reasoned that 
even a subgroup would not prevail in this case due to the reasonable 
justification that McDonnell Douglas had for its RIF.85 Consequently, 
the Eighth Circuit joined the Second and Sixth Circuits in holding that 
subgroups were non-cognizable for ADEA disparate impact complaints. 
At the time, no court had taken a contrary position.86 
E.  O’Connor and Smith: Encouragement for ADEA Disparate Impact 
Subgroups 
Adding to the Supreme Court’s lineage of ADEA decisions was 
O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp.87 Here, the Court faced the 
issue of whether a plaintiff must meet the McDonnell Douglas88 
standard for establishing a prima facie case for ADEA complaints.89 
While the Court has never formally stated that application of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA cases was proper, here the 
Court it assumed that it was.90  
In O’Connor, the defendant fired James O’Connor, a fifty-six-year-
old employee, and replaced him with a forty-year-old employee.91 
O’Connor sued, claiming that he was fired because of his age.92 Because 
McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to show that he was replaced by 
someone outside the protected class to establish a prima facie case,93 the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer.94 The 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. At the time of this case, the notion of ADEA disparate impact subgroups was not entirely 
without proponents. In McDonnell Douglas (1999), the EEOC argued that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), discussed infra Section II.F, 
permitted subgroup disparate impact complaints under the ADEA. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Lowe 
argued that the Court’s decision in Teal made subgroup claims cognizable. See supra Section II.B. 
However, the respective Circuit Courts rejected both arguments.  
 87. 517 U.S. 308 (1996). 
 88. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To survive summary 
judgment, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination by showing “(i) 
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications.” 
 89. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 309. 
 90. Id. at 311. But see Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 175 n.2 (2009) (observing that the 
Court’s interpretation of Title VII and the ADEA has not always been consistent, and reiterating that 
“the Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas . . . is 
appropriate in the ADEA context”). 
 91. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 309-310. 
 92. Id. at 309. 
 93. See 29 U.S.C. §631 (2016) (limiting ADEA protection to employees at least 40 years of age). 
 94. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 160 (W.D.N.C. 1993). 
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.95  
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that replacement by someone 
outside the protected class was not necessary for ADEA complaints 
because there is no logical connection between this standard and age 
discrimination.96 Rather, the ADEA offers protection against 
discrimination “because of age,” not because a person is at least forty 
years old.97 Consequently, the age of the person who replaced the 
protected employee is “utterly irrelevant” to ADEA claims.98 The Court 
also noted that replacement by an employee who is “substantially 
younger” is a better indicator of age discrimination than replacement by 
someone who is forty years or older.99 In this holding, the Court echoed 
its decision in Teal: discriminatory behavior does not have to affect 
every member of a protected class to be unlawful. 
Less than ten years after O’Connor, the Court finally settled the 
debate that first surfaced in Hazen Paper by formally recognizing 
disparate impact discrimination for ADEA claims in Smith v. City of 
Jackson, Miss.100 The plaintiffs in Smith accused the City of age 
discrimination based on a pay raise for all police officers that gave 
officers under forty a greater proportional raise than those forty and 
older.101 The city denied discrimination, contending that it enacted the 
policy to attract and retain police officers by increasing their pay to a 
level competitive with other local jurisdictions.102 Further, the city 
argued that the pay raise was based on years of service, and not on 
age.103 Undeterred by these explanations, the plaintiffs alleged age 
discrimination in violation of the ADEA on both disparate impact and 
disparate treatment theories.104 Both the district court and the appellate 
court dismissed their disparate impact claim.105 
Justice Stevens, writing for the Supreme Court’s plurality, began his 
analysis of the disparate impact allegation by looking to the text of the 
ADEA.106 Specifically, he compared it to the text of Title VII, 
 
 95. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 550 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 96. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311-312, 314. 
 97. Id. at 312. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 313. 
 100. 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005).  
 101. Id. at 231. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. In Smith, the Court split 4-1-3, with Justice Stevens writing for the plurality, joined by 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, 
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas concurred in the judgment. 
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concluding that “it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that 
text to have the same meaning in both statutes.”107 Based on this 
conclusion, the Court asserted that its decision in Griggs provided 
precedent on this issue, even though Griggs only addressed Title VII, 
not the ADEA.108 Relying heavily on that earlier decision, the Court 
concluded that the text of the ADEA intended to prevent the 
consequences of discrimination, not only discriminatory intent.109 
Importantly, the plurality observed the confusion caused by its decision 
in Hazen Paper, but emphasized that “there is nothing in our opinion in 
Hazen Paper that precludes an interpretation of the ADEA that parallels 
our holding in Griggs.”110 In short, the textual similarities between the 
ADEA and Title VII, combined with the Griggs holding, make disparate 
impact claims cognizable under the ADEA.111 Next, the plurality also 
offered its interpretation of the RFOA provision of the ADEA.112 In the 
Court’s view, the “reasonable factor other than age” language permits an 
employer to offer any reasonable, non-age-related explanation for its 
practice to avoid liability in ADEA disparate impact cases.113 This 
interpretation of the RFOA clause was the only part of the plurality’s 
opinion that prevented it from being a majority opinion.114 
Offering a much simpler take on the issue was Justice Scalia. In his 
mind, the question of ADEA disparate impact discrimination began and 
ended with the EEOC.115 Relying on the holding of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,116 Justice Scalia stated plainly, “[t]his is an 
absolutely classic case for deference to agency interpretation.”117 
Earlier, the EEOC had issued an interpretation of the ADEA that 
permitted disparate impact discrimination claims, and had also declared 
 
 107. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233. Since the Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167 
(2009), there is some doubt whether courts may interpret the ADEA by using a parallel application of 
Title VII. In Gross, the Court disallowed mixed-motive claims under the ADEA, finding that the 
“because of age” language in the ADEA required age to be the but-for cause of an employer’s 
discriminatory act for a plaintiff to prevail. Mixed-motive claims are permitted by statute under Title 
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2016). Notwithstanding the Gross holding, the Court’s decision in Smith 
remains good law for disparate impact cases. 
 108. Id. at 234. 
 109. Id. at 235-236. 
 110. Id. at 237-238. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 239. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In Chevron, the Court 
held that, where Congress has not explicitly spoken on a statute’s construction, but has implicitly 
delegated an agency to interpret it, courts must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the 
law. 
 117. Smith, 544 U.S. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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that these practices can only be justified when an employer has a 
genuine “business necessity” for the practice.118 The business necessity 
justification recommended by the EEOC and Justice Scalia would place 
a higher burden on an employer to defend a discriminatory practice than 
the “reasonable factor” approach endorsed by the plurality.119 However, 
because a majority of the Court could not agree on which standard the 
ADEA requires for employers to justify disparate impact discrimination, 
this question remained unsettled.120 Justice Scalia’s opinion only 
concurred on the narrower holding that the ADEA must recognize 
disparate impact discrimination claims.121 
F.  Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC: Updating the ADEA 
Subgroup Doctrine 
After the Smith decision in 2005, there had been no major changes in 
ADEA interpretation until the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC in 2017.122 Once again, Karlo 
arose from complaints of age discrimination resulting from a RIF.123 The 
plaintiffs brought action against PGW under the ADEA, alleging 
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and retaliation.124 The disparate 
impact claim accused PGW of discrimination only against employees 
fifty and older. Without precedent to support this complaint, the district 
court dismissed it as a non-cognizable subgroup claim under the 
ADEA.125  
At the very outset of its analysis, the Third Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision on the subgroup claim, announcing that “an 
ADEA disparate-impact claim may proceed when a plaintiff offers 
evidence that a specific, facially neutral employment practice caused a 
significantly disproportionate adverse impact based on age . . . including 
subgroup comparisons . . . .”126 According to the court, any other 
interpretation of the ADEA “would ignore significant age-based 
 
 118. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2004). The most recent version of the Code provides that an employer 
must “achieve a legitimate business purpose” to succeed on an RFOA defense in ADEA disparate 
impact cases. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(e)(1) (2012). 
 119. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (opining that the scope of disparate impact liability is narrower under 
the ADEA than Title VII, in part because of the RFOA provision). 
 120. Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 121. Id. at 243. 
 122. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 123. Id. at 66. 
 124. Id. at 67. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 68. 
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disparities” in certain adverse employment acts.127 
Appropriately, the Karlo court began its defense of this holding by 
looking to the text of the ADEA.128 First, the court reiterated much of 
the Smith plurality’s analysis to establish that disparate impact claims 
must be actionable under the ADEA due to its similarity with Title 
VII.129 Here, the court offered explicit support for the notion that 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)—the second paragraph of the ADEA’s 
prohibitions—necessitates disparate impact liability.130 After 
acknowledging the parallels between Title VII and the ADEA, the court 
again echoed the Smith plurality in its recognition of the differences 
between the two Acts.131 Here, the court recognized that the RFOA 
provision in the ADEA “imposes a lighter burden on the employer than 
its Title VII counterpart, the ‘business necessity’ defense.”132 The court 
also noted that ADEA plaintiffs must still identify a “specific 
employment practice[]” as the cause of discrimination in order to prevail 
in a disparate impact claim.133 Thus, while the court regarded the textual 
similarity between the Acts as sufficient to infer disparate impact from 
Title VII to the ADEA, it recognized the shift in burden carried by both 
employees and employers in ADEA cases.134 
 Following this juxtaposition of the ADEA and Title VII, the court 
turned directly to the issue of disparate impact subgroup claims.135 
Declining to follow other circuit courts’ decisions against recognition of 
ADEA subgroups,136 the Third Circuit lent its support for subgroups 
based on three factors: (1) the ADEA’s focus on age as a protected trait, 
(2) the ADEA’s objective to protect individuals, and (3) the “remedial 
purpose” of the Act.137  
First, to address the issue of age as a protected trait, the court 
submitted a brief reiteration and analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in O’Connor.138 According to the court, “[t]he key insight 
 
 127. Id. at 69. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 69-70. 
 132. Id. at 69. 
 133. Id. at 70. The “specific employment practice” requirement originates in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989). This requirement has since 
been removed from Title VII plaintiffs by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2016), but it remains intact for 
ADEA plaintiffs. 
 134. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70. 
 135. Id.  
 136. See supra Section II.D. 
 137. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70. 
 138. Id. at 70-71. See supra Section II.E for an analysis of O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers 
Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996). 
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from O'Connor is that the forty-and-older line . . . constrains the 
ADEA’s general scope; it does not modify or define [its] substantive 
prohibition against discrimination . . . because of such individual’s 
age.”139 Further, although O’Connor addressed an ADEA disparate 
treatment claim, the Karlo court found that its central focus applied 
equally to disparate impact claims.140 This cross-application of 
O’Connor’s holding is appropriate, said the court, because the ADEA 
forbids both disparate treatment and disparate impact “because of [an] 
individual’s age.”141 Based on this language common to both paragraphs 
of ADEA prohibitions, the court found it proper to extend O’Connor’s 
age-based protection to disparate impact claims.142 
Second, the court grounded its support for subgroups on Teal’s 
assertion that Congress intended Title VII to protect individuals, not an 
entire class.143 Importantly, the Karlo court highlighted the Teal Court’s 
rejection of the “bottom line” defense—that an employer could avoid 
liability for disparate impact discrimination if a discriminatory practice 
was offset by a separate practice that benefitted members of the 
protected class.144 Here, the court interpreted PGW’s defense as a 
restatement of Connecticut’s defense in Teal and succinctly rejected 
it.145 In short, the Karlo court viewed PGW’s defense as an attempt to 
justify its disproportionate termination of employees fifty and over by 
drawing attention to the large number of employees between ages forty 
and fifty that it retained.146 However, the court restated that the focus of 
Title VII and the ADEA is on protecting individuals, not a class.147 
Accordingly, the court ruled that PGW’s defense must fail.148 
Third and finally, the court opined that disallowing subgroups for 
ADEA disparate impact claims would be contrary to the purpose of the 
Act.149 Relying on its prior holding in an ADEA disparate treatment 
 
 139. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 71 (internal quotations omitted). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 71-72. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) with § 623(a)(2) (2106). 
 142. Id. at 72. 
 143. Id. See supra Section II.B for an analysis of Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
 144. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 72. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 73. 
 149. Id. at 74. Between its explanations of the second and third factors, the court took the 
opportunity to refute an argument raised by PGW and its amici. Specifically, the court noted the 
fundamental difference between Title VII protected traits, which are binary, and age, which is a 
“continuous variable.” As a result, certain statistical techniques used to support Title VII allegations are 
not available to ADEA claims. According to the court, subgroup claims may help compensate for this 
detriment to plaintiffs in ADEA cases. 
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case,150 the court reasoned that recognizing subgroups for disparate 
impact claims was necessary for the ADEA to fulfill its purpose.151 A 
decision to the contrary would permit employers to design policies that 
discriminate against fifty-and-older employees as long as those policies 
favor employees between forty and fifty.152 According to the court, this 
type of harsh treatment of older employees is the exact harm that 
Congress meant to prevent.153 The Third Circuit concluded that the only 
solution that was consistent with prior cases and the purpose of the 
ADEA was to permit disparate impact claims by subgroups.154 
III.  DISCUSSION: KARLO IS THE SENSIBLE SOLUTION FOR ADEA 
SUBGROUPS 
The current landscape of ADEA jurisprudence makes cognition of 
disparate impact subgroups both logical and necessary. The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals made this assertion clear in the comprehensive 
analysis of its Karlo decision.155 This Section argues that, given the 
opportunity, Congress or the Supreme Court must authorize ADEA 
disparate impact subgroup claims for three reasons: (1) the text and 
purpose of the ADEA support disparate impact subgroup claims; (2) 
Supreme Court precedent encourages this interpretation; and (3) 
practical and policy considerations justify recognition of these 
subgroups.156 To begin this discussion, Section III A examines the text 
of the ADEA, paying special attention to the RFOA provision. Then, 
Section III B demonstrates how the Karlo decision was necessary in 
light of earlier Supreme Court decisions, particularly O’Connor and 
Smith. Finally, Section III C examines the practical and policy 
implications of ADEA disparate impact subgroups. This Casenote 
concludes that recognition of ADEA disparate impact subgroups reflects 
an accurate reading of the ADEA, upholds Supreme Court precedent, 
and appropriately protects aging employees from unlawful 
discrimination. 
 
 150. Maxfield v. Sinclair Intern., 766 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding that allowing 
disparate treatment subgroup claims under the ADEA was necessary to protect the intent of the statute). 
 151. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 74. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 69-75. 
 156. After the completion of the Casenote, but before publication, Karlo and PGW settled this 
action for an undisclosed amount. Thus, the Supreme Court will not have the opportunity to decide on 
the cognition of ADEA subgroup plaintiffs for now. See Katherine Coig, PGW and Karlo Agree to 
Settlement, GLASSBYTES.COM (June 29, 2017), http://www.glassbytes.com/2017/06/pgw-and-karlo-
agree-to-settlement. 
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A.  Cognition of Disparate Impact Subgroups Is Consistent with the Text 
and Purpose of the ADEA. 
To start, the purpose and language of the ADEA authorize the 
cognition of disparate impact subgroups. As discussed above, the basic 
language of both Title VII and the ADEA are conspicuously similar.157 
This led courts to interpret the two statutes similarly in the early years of 
their existence, including a recognition of disparate impact liability 
under both Acts.158 To avoid redundancy, it suffices to state that the 
commonplace position before the Hazen Paper159 decision was that 
disparate impact liability was cognizable under the ADEA, and that the 
Smith holding restored this position with greater authority.160 
In addition to their authorization of disparate impact liability, another 
important similarity between Title VII and the ADEA is the focus on 
protecting individuals because of their protected trait rather than class 
membership.161 This focus on preventing discrimination for the benefit 
of individuals within a protected class receives strong support from the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Connecticut v. Teal162 and O’Connor v. 
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.163 In these decisions, the Court 
emphasized that Congress intended antidiscrimination laws to promote 
opportunities for protected individuals and to bar a bottom-line defense 
for employers. These concepts are easily transferrable to ADEA 
disparate impact subgroups. To draw an analogy between the facts in 
Teal and Karlo, simply compare the PGW employees ages fifty and 
older to the protected employees who failed the examination in Teal. In 
both cases, the employers attempted to justify their discriminatory acts 
by pointing to the positive treatment of other members of the protected 
 
 157. See supra note 12. 
 158. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact 
claims for Title VII complaints); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Wooden v. Bd. of Ed., 931 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1991); MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 
766, 771 (11th Cir. 1991); Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (assuming 
disparate-impact theory); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (1st Cir. 1986). See also Smith v. 
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (observing that after Griggs, courts were nearly unanimous in their 
support for disparate impact liability under the ADEA because Griggs had interpreted Title VII 
language identical to that contained in the ADEA). 
 159. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).  
 160. See supra Part I and Sections II.A, II.E. 
 161. See 29 U.S.C. 623(a) (2106) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age” 
(emphasis added)).  
 162. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See supra Section II.B for a summary and analysis 
of Teal.  
 163. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996). See supra Section II.E for a 
summary and analysis of O’Connor.  
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class. The employees ages forty to fifty that PGW retained are akin to 
the protected employees who passed the exam and received promotions 
in Teal. These employees received overly beneficial treatment to 
balance the adverse treatment of other members of the protected class. 
The holding in Teal firmly established that an employer may not escape 
liability for disparate impact discrimination on account of its favorable 
handling of other employees within the same protected group. The 
situation in Karlo is no different—PGW should not escape liability for 
discriminating against its fifty-and-older employees by treating its 
employees between forty and fifty extra favorably. 
Despite these similarities, two meaningful differences between Title 
VII and the ADEA have affected courts’ interpretations of these statutes. 
The first difference is the RFOA exception. This provision asserts that 
“any action otherwise prohibited” under the ADEA will be permissible 
when “the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than 
age.”164 Courts have interpreted this language as Congress’s attempt to 
temper the ADEA’s restrictions because, unlike Title VII, the ADEA 
does not target animus-based discrimination.165 The majority position, 
proposed by the plurality in Smith and reprised by the court in Karlo, is 
that the RFOA provision guards employers against some claims of 
disparate impact discrimination.166 Under this interpretation, the RFOA 
provision corresponds with the “business necessity” defense of Title 
VII,167 albeit with a lighter burden for a defendant, who must only show 
that it relied on some reasonable factor when it implemented the 
challenged practice.168 Fittingly, this view of the RFOA rests on the 
notion that unreasonable factors other than age are still prohibited, thus 
necessitating disparate impact liability under the ADEA.169 
The second significant difference between Title VII and the ADEA 
originated with the 1991 Amendment to Title VII. Congress 
implemented this Act in response to two Supreme Court cases that had 
altered the burden of a Title VII prima facie case—Price Waterhouse v. 
 
 164. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2016). 
 165. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-241 (2005). See also supra Section II.A. 
 166. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 238-239; Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 69-70 
(3d Cir. 2017).  
 167. The business necessity defense requires a defendant in a Title VII case to show that there 
were no alternative methods to implement the challenged employment practice that would have avoided 
a discriminatory effect. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 243. 
 168. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70.  
 169. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 238-239 (averring that Congress would not have included the RFOA 
provision unless it anticipated disparate impact liability to be available under the ADEA). But see Smith, 
544 U.S. at 251-253 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding that the RFOA provision acts 
only as a “safe harbor” for employers to avoid liability for disparate treatment, and therefore disparate 
impact liability is unavailable under the ADEA).  
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Hopkins170 and Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio.171 Of 
importance to this topic is the change effected by the Wards Cove 
holding.172 In response to that decision, Congress amended Title VII to 
remove the plaintiff’s burden to prove that a “specific business practice” 
resulted in disparate impact discrimination.173 In doing so, Congress 
lightened the burden of Title VII plaintiffs in establishing a disparate 
impact claim; however, this relaxed standard did not extend to ADEA 
plaintiffs.174 As a result, ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs retained the 
heightened burden of identifying a specific business practice as the 
source of discrimination to establish a prima facie case.175 Combined 
with the relaxed burden on the defendant springing from the RFOA 
provision, the “specific business practice” requirement created a 
framework that disadvantaged ADEA disparate impact plaintiffs much 
more than their Title VII counterparts. 
Until the Third Circuit became the first appellate court to endorse 
ADEA disparate impact subgroups, these textual differences between 
Title VII and the ADEA had only served to substantiate disparate impact 
liability under the ADEA. Yet, interpreted as a whole, they also lend 
credibility for the cognition of subgroups. Unquestionably, courts have 
interpreted the differences between the two Acts to place a heavier 
burden on ADEA plaintiffs and a lighter burden on ADEA defendants 
than those in Title VII cases. Currently, these standards require ADEA 
plaintiffs to produce statistical evidence that a specific employment 
practice has negatively impacted a disproportionately large number of 
employees forty and older. If plaintiffs clear this hurdle, employers can 
 
 170. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Price Waterhouse holding relieved 
an employer from liability when it could prove that it would have made the same decision regardless of 
the employee’s protected trait. The 1991 Amendment overturned this holding in part and restored 
liability in mixed-motive cases when an employee’s protected trait was a motivating factor in the 
adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2016). This change to mixed-motive claims 
under Title VII indirectly resulted in the elimination of ADEA mixed-motive cases. See Gross v. FBL 
Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 167, 177-178 (2009). 
 171. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  
 172. See supra note 133.  
 173. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2016). 
 174. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240; Karlo, 849 F.3d at 70. See also Sandra F. Sperino, The Sky 
Remains Intact: Why Allowing Subgroup Evidence Is Consistent with The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 90 MARQ. L. REV. ppp, 251-252 (2006-07). 
 175. Due to the split of the Court’s opinions in Smith, the case’s narrow holding was that the 
ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims. The Court did not decide what level of burden is borne by 
the defendant in these cases to avoid liability once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. The Title 
VII standard, endorsed by Justice Scalia in Smith, is that an alleged discriminatory practice is justified 
when it is a “business necessity.” The plurality’s standard in Smith, adopted by the court in Karlo, is that 
an alleged discriminatory practice is justified when it is “reasonable.” Should the Supreme Court 
formally adopt the former, it would heighten the burden on defendants; adopting the latter would have 
the opposite effect. According to the Smith plurality and Karlo, the latter standard is more consistent 
with the RFOA provision of the ADEA.   
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still escape liability if they have any reasonable explanation for the 
practice besides age.176 Outside of the Third Circuit, if the alleged 
practice does not disproportionately affect the entire group of forty-and-
older employees, the employer also escapes liability. The upshot is that, 
in circuits where Karlo is not binding, an employer may implement a 
RIF that discriminates based on age if (1) it retains enough employees 
between forty and fifty to offset the number of older employees it fired, 
or (2) it offers any reasonable explanation, other than age, for the RIF. 
When an employer has these options, subgroups of ADEA disparate 
impact plaintiffs have virtually no chance of prevailing on their claims. 
For the ADEA effectively to protect these individuals from 
discrimination, courts must permit disparate impact subgroups claims.177 
B.  Recent Supreme Court Decisions Have Made Earlier Circuit Court 
Cases Inconsistent with Current ADEA Jurisprudence. 
To be fair, the courts that have ruled against recognizing ADEA 
disparate impact subgroups deserve absolution; two of the circuit courts 
of appeals decided the issue before the Supreme Court’s O’Connor and 
Smith decisions, and the third decided after O’Connor but before 
Smith.178 Indeed, in the years leading up to the Smith decision, there was 
scant support for ADEA disparate impact liability in general, much less 
for subgroups.179 Only the Second and Eighth Circuits favored disparate 
 
 176. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 242-243. One reasonable factor that courts may accept as a defense is 
higher pay, which frequently correlates with older age among employees. See also Sperino, supra note 
174, at 265-266. 
 177. Courts have interpreted the 1991 Amendment to Title VII to place a clear divide between 
Title VII and all other federal discrimination laws, effectively eliminating the cross-application of Title 
VII jurisprudence to ADEA cases involving mixed-motive discrimination and the “specific business 
practice” pleading requirement. See supra notes 27, 29-30. However, the differences between Title VII 
and the ADEA are soundly analyzed in both Smith and Karlo, and do not affect the validity of ADEA 
disparate impact claims nor the issue of subgroups. In a similar vein, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Smith, along with other pre-Smith decisions, have interpreted the ADEA’s RFOA provision to bar 
disparate impact claims. See supra note 169. This Casenote proceeds under the assumption that the 
cognition of ADEA disparate impact claims is a settled issue after Smith. 
 178. See supra Section II.D. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected cognition of ADEA 
disparate impact subgroups in 1989. The Sixth and Eighth Circuits followed in 1991 and 1999, 
respectively. The Supreme Court decided O’Connor in 1996 and Smith in 2005. 
 179. See generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003); Adams v. Fla. Power 
Corp., 255 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2001); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999); Ellis v. 
United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. Smithline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719 
(3d Cir. 1995); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Data Gen. 
Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993); Roush v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 10 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 1993). See 
also Joel Allen, et al., Split Decisions: The Lack of Consensus on Disparate Impact Claims Under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 63 (2004); George O. Luce, Why 
Disparate Impact Claims Should Not Be Allowed Under the Federal Employer Provisions of the ADEA, 
99 NW U. L. REV. 437 (2004-05). 
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impact liability for ADEA claims,180 and both of those Circuits had 
explicitly denounced liability for subgroup claims.181 Based on courts’ 
positions on the issue, it is safe to suppose that the Supreme Court 
decisions in O’Connor and Smith surprised many in the legal 
community. 
Undoubtedly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had a considerable 
jurisprudential advantage over the courts with which it split when it 
decided Karlo. First, O’Connor established that ADEA protection 
hinges on a plaintiff’s age, and not class membership.182 This holding 
increased the potential situations to which the ADEA can apply by 
opening doors to certain plaintiffs that were previously closed.183 
Perhaps a more important implication to the O’Connor decision is that it 
displaced the necessity of using forty-and-over as the sole comparison 
group for ADEA plaintiffs. Before O’Connor, courts required plaintiffs 
to show that they were replaced by someone outside the ADEA’s 
protections;184 if they could not, the court reasoned that the employer 
must not have violated the Act.185 After O’Connor, a court’s focus 
necessarily shifted from the protected class to the protected 
individual.186 This doctrinal shift created the possibility that a 
subgroup—a collection of individuals—can raise an ADEA claim even 
when the entire protected class is not harmed by an employer’s action.187  
Moreover, Smith’s holding upended the position of a substantial 
majority of Appellate Courts when it sanctioned disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA.188 Like O’Connor, the Smith decision permits a new 
brand of ADEA plaintiff to raise discrimination claims.189 When taken 
together, the O’Connor and Smith holdings create a “hybrid” ADEA 
claim that had not existed before. This type of claim—disparate impact 
 
 180. See generally Criley v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam); 
Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 181. See supra Section II.D. 
 182. See supra Section II.E. 
 183. See Kurt Schaub, The “Substantially Younger” Requirement in O’Connor v. Consolidated 
Coin Caterers Corp.: Will ADEA Plaintiffs Lose Again?, 16 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP’T L.J. 226 (1998-
99). By dropping the requirement that an ADEA plaintiff be replaced by a person under forty, the Court 
permits claims that were previously barred.  
 184. See Tara Van Ausdall, O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.: Can an ADEA 
Plaintiff Ever Win?, 33 TULSA L.J. 656 (1997-98). 
 185. See, e.g., Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 84 (5th Cir. 1995); O’Connor v. Consol. 
Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 (4th Cir. 1995). See also Schaub, supra note 183, at 240. 
 186. While the O’Connor decision addressed a disparate treatment claim, its decision should have 
no detrimental consequences for disparate impact claims. This decision affected only which plaintiffs 
could raise claims under the ADEA, and did not address the type of claims which plaintiffs could bring 
under the Act. 
 187. See Schaub, supra note 183 at 240; Sperino, supra note, 174 at 251-252. 
 188. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 189. See supra Section II.E. 
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discrimination where the comparison group is within the protected 
class—is tailor-made for ADEA subgroups. So when the Karlo court 
handed down its decision, it did so with the benefit of two Supreme 
Court cases that were unavailable to the courts that had previously 
refuted disparate impact subgroup claims. To put Karlo’s conclusion of 
in overly simplistic terms, the court looked at O’Connor, looked at 
Smith, and did the math. 
The strongest arguments against cognition of disparate impact 
subgroups have already been laid out by the appellate courts who have 
decided against it.190 However, as the Karlo court correctly pointed out, 
these arguments can no longer stand after O’Connor and Smith.191 One 
of the primary concerns of the courts urging disallowance of ADEA 
disparate impact subgroups was based on an evidentiary objection.192 In 
short, these courts worried that plaintiffs could manipulate statistics so 
that almost any adverse employment action would appear discriminatory 
toward some subgroup of plaintiffs.193 While the Karlo court recognized 
this concern as valid, it believed that the risk of “gerrymandering” age 
groups was exaggerated, and that courts must be able to evaluate these 
claims on a case-by-case basis.194  
Two other modifications to ADEA analysis have further alleviated 
this concern over age-group gerrymandering. First, the Court held in 
Gen. Dynamic Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline that the ADEA’s purpose is to 
protect older workers, and therefore “relatively young” plaintiffs could 
not raise claims of reverse discrimination under the Act.195 The 
implication of Cline on a subgroup analysis is that it prevents ADEA 
plaintiffs from “banding” age groups (e.g. employees ages fifty to sixty) 
to create a subgroup of plaintiffs with the best chances of prevailing at 
trial.196 After Cline, ADEA plaintiffs may only set a lower limit (e.g. 
employees ages fifty and over) for the purpose of subgrouping. 
Additionally, the Court’s O’Connor opinion imposes a requirement that 
a replacement be “substantially younger” than the plaintiff to assert an 
 
 190. See supra Section II.C. 
 191. Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 75-80 (3d Cir. 2017).  
 192. See, e.g., EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir. 1999); Lowe v. 
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1373 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 193. McDonnell Douglas, 191 F.3d at 951; Lowe, 886 F.3d at 1373. See also Sperino, supra note 
174, at 247; Terrence J. Dee, Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination by 
Showing Disparate Impact within the Protected Group, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 337 (1991). 
 194. Karlo, 849 F.3d at 77-78. 
 195. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004). 
 196. See Schaub, supra note 183, at 255 (suggesting rules to prevent the possibility of ADEA 
banded subgroups; Sperino, supra note 174, at 248 (observing that the holding in Cline eliminated the 
possibility of banded subgroups); Timothy Tommaso, Disparate Impact and the ADEA: So, Who Is 
Going to Be in the Comparison Group?, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1490 (2005-2006) (expressing concern 
over ADEA reverse discrimination claims and banded subgroups). 
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ADEA claim.197 While the Court did not clarify the exact meaning of 
this standard, lower courts have generally interpreted it to mean at least 
five years,198 and probably more.199 Based on these decisions, the lower 
limit of an ADEA subgroup would be at least forty-five years, but more 
likely fifty or older. This restriction, along with the impossibility of 
banded subgroups, already reduces the concern over gerrymandered 
subgroups. 
One final problem with this gerrymandered-age-group argument is its 
direct conflict with the Court’s holding in Connecticut v. Teal.200 By 
disallowing disparate impact subgroup claims, a court would condone a 
bottom-line defense that balances the discriminatory treatment of certain 
members of a protected class (e.g. employees fifty and over) with the 
favorable treatment of others (e.g. employees between forty and fifty).201 
The Court in Teal made clear that compensatory treatment of part of a 
protected class does not relieve a defendant from liability for unlawful 
discrimination against other members of that class.202 Integrating Teal’s 
conclusion with the holdings of O’Connor and Smith produces a strong 
indication that Supreme Court precedent favors cognition of ADEA 
disparate impact subgroups. Based on these legal developments, courts 
should now follow the Karlo holding and disregard prior decisions to 
the contrary. 
C.  Practical and Policy Considerations Strongly Favor Disparate 
Impact Subgroup Claims for the ADEA to Remain Effective. 
Finally, courts must recognize disparate impact subgroups to 
guarantee that the ADEA is effective in preventing discriminatory 
practices. As noted above, most courts’ application of the ADEA 
already tilts heavily in favor of employers. A disallowance of disparate 
impact subgroups would tip the ADEA scale still further toward 
defendants. Should courts continue to ban these claims, they would 
render the ADEA largely ineffective during a time when protection for 
 
 197. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996). 
 198. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 665 F.2d 528, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding that a 
difference in age of five years is “substantially younger” for ADEA purposes). 
 199. See, e.g., Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a 
ten-year age difference satisfied the O’Connor standard, but suggesting that six or seven years would 
not); Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that a five-year age 
difference was not “substantially younger”); Adkins v. Safeway, Inc., 985 F.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (finding an eight-year age difference to be insufficient to prove age discrimination). 
 200. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See supra Section II.B for an analysis of Teal. See 
also Karlo, 849 F.3d at 75, 78-79; Sperino, supra note 174, at 254-256. 
 201. See supra Section III.C for further analysis of Teal as applied to the issue of ADEA disparate 
impact subgroups. 
 202. Teal, 457 U.S. at 456. 
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older employees is increasing.  
Recent studies show that the average age of workers in the U.S. is just 
over 42 years.203 This means that over half of the workforce is currently 
protected by the ADEA.204 Further, workplace trends indicate that 
workers over the age of fifty-five comprise a growing segment of the 
workforce, and that this percentage is likely to continue increasing for 
the immediate future.205 These statistics present a vastly different 
backdrop than in 1967 when Congress enacted the ADEA.206 Workers 
between the ages of forty to fifty are now closer to the average age of 
American employees; they are no longer are the “old folks” in the 
workplace. That distinction, and the stereotypes that accompany it, have 
shifted to workers at the upper range of ADEA protection. If these older 
workers are forced to compare themselves to the younger members of 
the protected class, it will become nearly impossible for groups of older 
plaintiffs to prevail in ADEA lawsuits. 
For example, suppose a business employs 1,000 individuals—500 
employees under age forty and 500 employees forty and older.207 The 
employer has decided to lay off 100 employees. A perfectly even 
distribution of layoffs would see the release of fifty employees under 
age forty and fifty employees ages forty and older. Before Karlo, a 
savvy employer could avoid ADEA liability by terminating all twenty-
three of its employees ages fifty-five and older and twenty-seven (out of 
160) of its employees ages forty to fifty-four. In this scenario, the 
subgroup of plaintiffs fifty-five and older would not be able to allege 
age discrimination because the layoff did not disproportionately affect 
all employees protected by the ADEA. Under the Karlo holding, a court 
could analyze the statistics and see that the employer had laid off 100% 
of employees in the fifty-five-and-older subgroup, but only 17% of 
workers ages forty to fifty-four. In this extreme, but feasible, scenario, a 
reasonable jury could determine that the employer had discriminated 
against the subgroup of plaintiffs in violation of the ADEA. Thus, it is 
 
 203. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEY, https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm (last updated January 19, 2018). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Adele Hayutin, Michaela Beals & Elizabeth Borges, The Aging U.S. Workforce: A 
Chartbook of Demographic Shifts, STANFORD CENTER ON LONGEVITY (2013), 
http://longevity3.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/The_ 
Aging_U.S.-Workforce.pdf. 
 206. Id. Between 1960 and 1970, workers ages 55 and older represented just 18% of the 
workplace. This figure dropped to as low as 12% by 1990. Since then, this figure has risen to nearly 
23% and is expected to rise to 25% by 2020. 
 207. The figures in this hypothetical are based on the 2016 age distribution of workers in the U.S. 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE 
STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm. 
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unreasonable for courts to continue to prevent disparate impact 
subgroups from bringing this type of claim before a jury.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Mass layoffs and reductions in force have become unfortunate and 
common events in U.S. workplaces. Armed with in-house lawyers, 
experienced HR professionals, and favorable odds under the ADEA, 
employers risk little by firing most, or all, of their older employees to 
make space for “new blood.” As long as the layoff does not 
disproportionately affect the entire class of employees over forty, groups 
of older plaintiffs have no recourse under the ADEA. When courts 
disallow these subgroups in disparate impact cases, they handcuff the 
ADEA and deprive older workers the legal protections to which they are 
entitled. Certainly, this is not the result Congress intended when it 
passed this Act in 1967.  
The circuit courts that have refused to recognize ADEA disparate 
impact subgroups did so on questionable grounds and without current 
Supreme Court guidance. These courts were biased by a misplaced 
concern that plaintiffs would abuse the ADEA to fabricate subgroups 
and take advantage of deep-pocketed employers. Rather than trust 
judges to discern between opportunistic scammers and genuine victims 
of discrimination, these courts instead proscribed an entire category of 
ADEA plaintiff. These decisions were not only unfair to older workers, 
they were contrary to the purpose of the ADEA. 
Promisingly, the Supreme Court has indicated a greater openness to 
ADEA disparate impact subgroups. In cases such as Teal, O’Connor, 
and Smith, the Court has rejected the “bottom-line” defense in disparate 
impact cases, placed a stronger focus on protecting individual plaintiffs, 
and expressly endorsed disparate impact liability under the ADEA. In its 
recent Karlo decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals convincingly 
synthesized these Supreme Court decisions into an authoritative new 
position. Carefully considering the text and purpose of the ADEA, the 
court determined that subgroups are cognizable in disparate impact 
claims. Now it is up to Congress or the Supreme Court to ensure that 
recognition of ADEA disparate impact subgroups is the standard rule in 
all courts. This outcome is the only solution that is fair to plaintiffs, 
consistent with Court precedent, and true to the purpose of the ADEA. 
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